【2022年3月14日，美国资深传媒人乔纳森 · 特普曼（Jonathan Tepperman）发布了对卡内基莫斯科中心的高级研究员亚历山大 · 加布耶夫（Alexander Gabuev）的访谈。加布耶夫曾是俄罗斯《生意人报》的外交记者和编辑，现在也是卡内基莫斯科中心俄罗斯亚太项目主理人。访谈中，两人梳理普京发动战争的心态，为何局面变得如此糟糕，此外，加布耶夫也是一位中国问题专家，对战争中的中俄关系也有自己的看法。】
特普曼（下称“问”）: 为什么普京和他的顾问们在战争开始后犯了这么多基本的错误? 发生了什么事？
加布耶夫: 有几种解释。媒体没有充分报道的首要问题是他们对乌克兰的痴迷，以及他们对乌克兰对俄罗斯外交政策重要性的基本误判。他们认为，如果没有对乌克兰的主导地位，俄罗斯就不可能成为一个大国，而与北约关系密切的乌克兰——即使它仍处于北约之外，也会对国家安全构成威胁。
普京的另一个困扰是，他相信俄罗斯人和乌克兰人是同一个民族。当他谈到这个的时候，他不是在胡说八道。自从成为总统以来，他一直沉迷于乌克兰，但是在过去的两年里，他变得更加专注于这个故事，由于新冠疫情，这两年他都在自我孤立中度过。他花了很多时间阅读历史材料，但他的阅读非常有选择性。很多都是档案材料，他显然没有亲自去档案馆，因为他不是历史学家。所以需要他人为他准备好现成的材料。
想象一下，一个俄罗斯沙皇在一个强大国家的最高层，20多年来没有受到挑战，按照俄罗斯的标准，他也是幸运和成功的。俄罗斯从来没有像普京执政时期那样自由繁荣过，特别是他的前两个任期。显然，在过去战争的两周，这一切都被打破了。但是此前，他非常成功。过去成功经历所带来的自信，再加上他的年龄和与世隔绝的影响，他觉得历史会记载，正是他把乌克兰回归俄罗斯的控制之下。整个想法是荒谬的，但在他的世界观中，这是一个值得为之奋斗的荣耀。
他犯错的另一个原因是，他从来没有去过俄罗斯的国家安全机构，对他们说，“嘿，伙计们，一年左右之后，我想入侵乌克兰，所以让我们开始考虑这些情景，讨论经济成本。”全面入侵乌克兰是一个难以想象的想法，以至于普京试图尽可能地隐藏他的计划。它没有进行严肃的战争规划，而是成为了一个只有少数军事规划者参与的秘密行动。
问：为什么开战是秘密的？
加布耶夫: 普京是个克格勃，这就是他做事的方式。他非常担心一些细节会被泄露，所以他把讨论限制在尽可能小的范围内，只有志同道合的人参与其中。如果他把自己的计划告诉圈外的高级官员，将会给整个体系带来冲击。
问: 为什么？
加布耶夫: 因为这个想法显然很疯狂，战争成本显然也很可怕，还因为许多俄罗斯官员比普京更了解乌克兰的真实状况。
问: 普京声称乌克兰是由纳粹领导的这一说法似乎特别奇怪，尤其是因为乌克兰领导层的许多成员都是犹太人。
加布耶夫: 我们把话说清楚。在乌克兰有右翼分子，民族主义者之类的。问题在于普京目光短浅，他只关注乌克兰政治格局的一部分，而没有看到整个格局。
问题的另一部分涉及到一个悖论: 普京对中国和阿拉伯世界的了解远远超过他对自己邻国的了解，尤其是乌克兰。原因是，当他与中国领导人打交道时，他会说，“我不懂中文。我不了解这里的文化。我需要一个专业的中国观察家来帮助我，理解那里到底发生了什么。”中东也是如此。
但是，当谈到美国和欧洲时，会说德语的普京会说，“哦，我们自己就是欧洲人，所以我们了解他们。”他不会依赖真正的专家，这导致了许多误解。
说到乌克兰，情况就更糟了。处理乌克兰事务的俄罗斯总统办公室一直是俄罗斯的国内单位。外交官们从未参与其中，分管乌克兰事务的人员素质真的很糟糕。他们有这些误解，因为普京那一代的俄罗斯人和乌克兰人，都是前苏联过来人，有着相同背景，看着相同的电影，讲着相同的笑话。
因此，当普京不得不处理乌克兰问题时，他不可能咨询专业人士说，“好吧，这是怎么回事?”当乌克兰人开始做一些奇怪的事情，比如强制立法说乌克兰语或者表现出强烈的乌克兰身份认同感时，他说，“我了解乌克兰。乌克兰和我们一样。这是外国的玩意，是强加给他们的东西。”
这有助于解释为什么这次行动的设计，本是一次外科手术式的打击，以消除乌克兰的空中防御系统，摧毁其指挥和控制系统、目标武器库和乌克兰军队的集结地。普京认为这会让乌克兰总统泽连斯基在第一天逃到美国华盛顿。
他认为乌克兰军队士气低落，一部分人会用鲜花迎接俄罗斯，而另一部分则不会抵抗。他对此深信不疑。他寻求最大限度地减少平民伤亡，因为他把乌克兰人看作是我们的人民和亲俄罗斯的人。
参与计划的俄罗斯军方官员不够多，他们不会问，“好吧，如果不是这样呢?”？我们准备好攻占大城市了吗？我们准备好占领这个国家了吗?”没有 b 计划，没有 c 计划。
问: 即使是这样，为什么俄罗斯军方领导人不告诉应征入伍的士兵他们要去乌克兰打仗，而不是告诉他们，只是去白俄罗斯演习，这就导致了俄罗斯小孩甚至不知道他们在哪里打仗，更不用说为什么打仗了？
加布耶夫: 因为对行动安全的痴迷。在领导层看来，知道任务的人越少越好。我们有证据表明，当他们提前一天终于告诉高级指挥官最终的任务是什么时，他们中的许多人明显地感到震惊，并遭到了很多反对意见。
因为如果你告诉任何一个神志清醒的俄罗斯军人，他们的任务是轰炸基辅，把它从纳粹手中解放出来，他们就会知道这是个什么鬼地方，对吧？所以士气过去是，现在也是，非常低落。没有人做好准备，这就解释了俄军为什么表现如此糟糕。
事实上，看起来俄罗斯军队并不像我们想象的那么强大。对此我也有一个解释。在过去的20多年里，普京一直试图使军队专业化，但是要确保它不会成为一个竞争的权力中心。不像在美国军队，有像大卫 · 彼得雷乌斯将军或斯坦利 · 麦克里斯特尔将军这样的人物，他们是世界级的知识分子，被培养成高级政治家，大多数俄罗斯高级指挥官不会说任何外语，也从未接受过外部世界如何运作的教育。
问：俄罗斯公众如何看待这场战争? 许多俄罗斯人明白乌克兰正在发生什么吗？
加布耶夫: 我认为人们的第一反应是震惊，他们不知道发生了什么。俄罗斯国内的宣传效率很高。克里姆林宫断绝了所有独立报道的来源。许多记者已经逃离，因为政府将独立报道和反战口号定为犯罪，这意味着你现在可能因为说错话而在监狱里呆上15年。与此同时，所有的电视频道——大多数人都是从这些频道获得新闻的——现在都在重复普京的说法，即乌克兰领导人是法西斯主义者，他们的行为像真主党或哈马斯一样，把大炮放在妇产医院里。
大多数俄罗斯人不会说英语，也不会寻找其他信息来源。只有16% 俄罗斯人有护照，只有8% 俄罗斯人去过需要签证的国家。因此，他们要么相信政府的宣传，要么选择视而不见。
现在，超级富豪精英们感到恐惧。他们中的很多人现在都受到了制裁，他们完蛋了。他们能做什么？而且普京肯定会毫不犹豫地对抗议者使用子弹。所以那些反对的人可以选择逃跑，或者，如果他们是精英，他们可以说，“好吧，我们已经把自己的命运和普京联系在一起了，尽管事情会变得很糟糕，至少我们会像朝鲜的权贵或者伊朗的革命建立者一样。不管是酒窖的名酒玛歌酒庄，还是名表，还有足够的路易威登行李箱，都应有尽有。所以我们会住在俄罗斯堡垒，我们会支持普京，我们会挺过去。
至于受过教育的阶层，20% 到30% 人口是独立的专业人士，与政权没有关系，他们中的大多数将会逃离。最优秀和最聪明的人将大批离开。我的大部分社交圈子已经移民了。但是如今对俄罗斯人存在排挤，所以很多人会留下来。
问：你如何看待这是普京末日的开始: 这场战争将不可避免地变得越来越糟，如果真的这样持续，俄罗斯人民会转而反对他？
加布耶夫: 我们不知道，但我认为这种情况很有可能是不现实的。如果你看看俄罗斯在与乌克兰谈判中的要求，他们会告诉你普京不会回头。所以如果 a 计划失败了，他准备把基辅和 哈尔科夫变成阿勒颇（叙利亚）和格罗兹尼（车臣）。然后，俄罗斯将需要占领乌克兰，因为一旦俄罗斯军队回国，无论他们建立了什么样的傀儡政府，都会倒台。所以俄罗斯会占领乌克兰，会有一场伊拉克式的叛乱，最终结果会很糟糕，因为俄罗斯不可能永远占领乌克兰。这里的问题是，它可以持续很多年，就像美国在阿富汗的行动一样。但是大多数俄罗斯人不会抗议这场战争。
问：甚至当俄罗斯军人被尸体袋带回家？
加布耶夫: 我不认为这会改变什么，因为这个政权会变得越来越专制。我们有很多这样的例子。看看两伊战争: 那是一场漫长而血腥的战争，但民众并没有反对独裁政权。俄罗斯的政治反对派已经解散。社会中最活跃的部分将移居国外。即使抗议活动真的发生了，政府也只会拿出更大的棍子。
在经济方面，西方谈论减少对俄罗斯石油和天然气的依赖。如果你是美国或英国，你可以很快做到这一点，因为他们并不那么依赖俄罗斯的能源。但如果你是欧盟，你不可能在一夜之间做到这一点，这需要好几年的时间。
如果你是俄罗斯政府，从向欧洲和中国出售石油和天然气中获得了巨额收入，所有的债务都是以卢布计价的，而且卢布汇率急坠，那么你的国家预算就会好得多。通货膨胀肯定会达到顶峰，但你会有足够的钱。
人们的生活质量将大幅下降，但你将有足够的钱养活他们，特别是因为俄罗斯在粮食方面是自给自足的。食物的质量会比以前更差，但是人们仍然有东西吃。俄罗斯人会有工作。人们会害怕政府的大棍子。
所以我认为，俄罗斯变成一个大号“伊朗”，继而又变成一个大号“朝鲜”的可能性，远远高于俄罗斯人奋起抗议。
特别是自从那些重要的人，那些持枪的人，因为他们（对普京）的忠诚而被精心挑选出来。西方国家没有任何渠道与他们对话，并说，“嘿，如果你除掉普京，你就会得到宽恕，你也不用去海牙的国际刑事法庭。”
问: 你写道，普京小圈子可信赖的顾问，实际上从与西方的冲突中受益。为什么？
加布耶夫: 他们可能没有预见到这场冲突的规模，也没有预见到俄罗斯会变成一个大号“朝鲜”。但是，即使你是朝鲜人，虽然你的很多人生活在痛苦之中，有些人仍然生活得很好。即使馅饼缩小了，精英阶层仍然得到了最大的一块。我认为俄罗斯的经济将变得更加国家主导。但它将由普京的朋友领导，因此，他们将成为这个改日换天新现实的受益者。
问: 在战前的几年里，西方国家能做些什么来阻止普京入侵俄罗斯？比如说，奥巴马总统向乌克兰提供了它所要求的致命性军事援助，这会有什么不同吗？
加布耶夫: 很难说这是否会阻止普京。(乌克兰）与北约更密切的合作正是促使这次入侵的原因，所以我认为增加军事力量会适得其反。
另一个选择是，北约大声说，是的，我们的大门没有关上，每个国家(包括乌克兰)都有权选择自己的盟友，但是每个联盟都有权选择自己的成员国，乌克兰不是一个可能的候选国，这既是因为俄罗斯反对，也是因为乌克兰还没有准备好。这或许会有所帮助。但应该留给历史学家去争论。不幸的是，现在讨论这些已经无关紧要了。
问：你是一个中国专家，所以我们来谈谈这个角度。你认为普京和他的顾问们意识到这场危机将如何改变莫斯科和北京之间的权力平衡吗？
加布耶夫: 再说一次，他们没有预见到这场战争的规模，也没有预见到西方的反应。他们认为会有一些新的制裁措施，因此会对中国有一些额外的依赖，但并没有那么多。
你必须了解2014年到2022年初期间发生了什么。在俄罗斯第一次入侵乌克兰和西方实施制裁之后，莫斯科在情感上转向了北京。但中国当时并没有像俄罗斯人所希望的那样提供足够多的援助。因此，在2015年中期，早期的乐观情绪转变为悲观情绪，我在政府部门的熟人开始说，“我们以为中国是我们的朋友，但结果证明这是非常自私的。”
但后来人们认识到，所有大国都是自私的，我们不应该对此感情用事。有一种感觉，中国没有背叛我们，他们只是在做对自己有利的事情，就像我们做对自己有利的事情一样。
大约在那个时候，我开始在私下和公开场合辩称，趋势是不对称的: 中国正在获得更多的影响力，如果情况继续这样下去，那么10年、15年后ーー如果我们不稳定与西方的关系，如果我们不进行国内结构性改革ーー中国将处于一个主宰条件的地位。
例如，北京可以说: “嘿，俄罗斯，你还在向印度出售武器吗？印度不是中国的朋友，所以你应该停下来。”
但我经常从政府官员那里得到的回应是，“在2014年，在第一次乌克兰战争之前，我们过度接触西方。然而，我们能够在必要的时候站起来反击。现在中国更加重要，但是它不像克里米亚问题之前的欧盟那样高大。我们没有政治上的分歧。那么，中国为什么要对我们刻薄呢？他们肯定会在商业交易上进行艰难的讨价还价，但这是意料之中的。”
问: 从那以后情况有什么变化吗？
加布耶夫: 现在这是一个完全不同的角力，普京和他的随从预料不到的局面。我认为中国选择了一个非常明智的策略。在如何应对俄罗斯无法预料的举动方面，中国有自己的模板。在中国看来，俄罗斯的举动往往是不可预测和非理性的。这个模板是克里米亚就定型了。当被列入制裁名单时，中国表示支持和平，尊重乌克兰的领土完整和主权，并且从未承认俄罗斯的吞并克里米亚。它可能批评了美国的单边制裁，但同时也遵守了制裁的字面意思。然而，与此同时，中国也尽其所能，最大限度地利用在俄罗斯的新机遇。
到那时，中国的机会将是巨大的。长期以来，俄罗斯一直不愿向中国出售其最尖端的军事技术。你猜怎么着？很快，莫斯科将别无选择。俄罗斯也不愿意做很多人民币交易，因为人民币不能完全自由兑换。现在俄罗斯别无选择，人民币将成为中俄贸易的默认货币。这些都是普京没有想到的战争副产品。
问: 你认为这个新世界在很多方面对中国更好。但是，一个全球贸易体制受到威胁、美国和欧洲正在复兴的不太和平的世界，对中国难道不是一件坏事吗？
加布耶夫: 这些部分是糟糕的，但中国无法干预，而必须适应普京的抉择。就像处理飓风或火山爆发一样。与此同时，中国看到美国分心了ーー这场战争将耗费拜登剩余的总统任期。如果拜登不能成功实现他的国内议程，美国的分歧和其他国内问题只会变得更糟。这对中国来说是一个很大的好处。
问：你能想象有没有这样的情况: 普京开始显得如此非理性和不稳定，或者支持俄罗斯的成本如此之高，以至于中国放弃了俄罗斯？
加布耶夫: 我不这么认为。中国将会非常谨慎，不会公开支持俄罗斯的战争。但是一个更弱的俄罗斯对中国是有利的，因为中国将获得双边关系更多的控制权。
问: 回到乌克兰: 你能想象与基辅或西方国家达成任何协议，让普京同意结束战争吗？
加布耶夫: 泽伦斯基总统不会接受普京现在推动的极端主义协议，因为泽连斯基很清楚，一旦他接受了，他在战争中获得的声望就会被摧毁。乌克兰现在受制于自己的宣传。我认为许多乌克兰人实际上相信他们正在赢得这场战争，如果他们不阻止普京，他们都会牺牲。所以他们不会投降。
这的确是一个悲剧，但我认为他们不会接受一个让他们半依赖于侵略者的和平解决方案，即使这能拯救他们的城市。
这场战争中最丑陋的日子，就在我们面前，而不是在我们身后。
问：假设你有15分钟的时间，向拜登总统提供有关俄罗斯政策的建议。你会怎么说？
加布耶夫: 听着，我是俄罗斯公民，我是俄罗斯爱国者。乌克兰发生的事情是个悲剧，对我的国家来说也是个悲剧。在情感层面上，这是很难接受的。你无法说服自己，为什么普京会认为俄罗斯在乌克兰的外交政策目标，唯有战争手段。这是无底深渊，后果是如此明显。它们对每个人来说都是显而易见的，那么你为什么要发动战争呢？
看到基辅——我母亲出生的城市，我度过部分童年的地方，以及我的许多朋友仍在的地方——被俄罗斯的炸弹摧毁，令人心碎。他们是我们最亲近的亲属。我在乌克兰有这么多的个人联系。这是个悲剧。但我不想给拜登总统关于如何打击我自己国家的建议。
来源：艾森看天下
读者推荐
附：英文原文https://octavian.substack.com/p/inside-the-bear-alexander-gabuev?s=r
Putin in His Labyrinth: Alexander Gabuev on the View from Moscow
–Jonathan Tepperman
“If plan A doesn't work, and it hasn't, Putin is ready to turn Kiev and Kharkiv into Aleppo and Grozny.”
While Russia's increasing isolation may be a well deserved consequence of its brutal war in Ukraine, it nonetheless poses several dangers for the West. One is that the Russian public will lose its last access to honest reporting about what's happening in the United States, in Ukraine, and in their own country. Another is that figuring out what the Russian people are thinking, and their government is planning, will become even harder for those of us on the outside. In the hopes of getting a glimpse inside the black box before it closes entirely, I reached out to on Friday to an old friend, Alexander Gabuev. A former diplomatic correspondent and editor at Kommersant, a Russian newspaper, he's now a senior fellow and chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center—although he, like many of his colleagues and a huge number of other Russians, recently left the country. We spoke about Putin's mindset, how he got Ukraine so wrong, and—since Sasha is a China expert—about what this all means for the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
Octavian Report: Why have Putin and his advisors made so many basic mistakes since the war began? What's going on?
Alexander Gabuev: There are several explanations. The overarching one that's not covered enough in the media is their obsession with Ukraine and their basic misjudgment of its importance for Russian foreign policy. They perceive that without dominance over Ukraine, Russia cannot be a great power, and that a Ukraine closely associated with NATO—even if it remains outside the alliance—is a national security threat.
The other part of Putin's obsession is his belief that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. He's not bullshitting when he talks about this. He's been obsessed with Ukraine since he became president, but he became much more absorbed by this narrative during the last two years, which he spent in self-isolation due to COVID. He spent a lot of time reading historical stuff, but his reading was very selective. A lot of it was archival material, and he obviously didn't go to archives himself because he's not a historian. So somebody brought this stuff to his desk.
Imagine a Russian czar at the top of a powerful country, unchallenged for 20-plus years, who's also been lucky and successful by Russian standards. Russia has never been as free and prosperous at the same time as it has been during Putin's reign, particularly his first two terms. That's all been undone over the last two weeks, obviously. But before that, he was very successful. To the self-confidence born from that success, add the impact of his age and his isolation, and you get a state of mind that led him to believe that his legacy would be the return of Ukraine to Russia's control. The whole idea is irrational, but in his worldview, it's a prize worth fighting for.
Another reason for all the mistakes is that he never went to Russia's national-security establishment and said, “Hey guys, in a year or so I want to invade Ukraine, so let's start thinking through the scenarios and debate the economic costs.” A full invasion of Ukraine was such an unimaginable idea that Putin tried to keep his plan as well hidden as possible. Instead of serious war planning, it became a clandestine operation, with only a handful of military planners involved.
OR: Why was it clandestine?
Gabuev: Putin's a KGB man, and that's the way he does stuff. He was really concerned that some of the details would be leaked, so he kept the discussion limited to the smallest possible circle, with only like-minded people involved. Had he told senior officials outside that circle what he was planning, it would have sent shockwaves throughout the system.
OR: Why?
Gabuev: Because the idea is obviously crazy, and the costs are obviously crazy, and because many Russian officials have a better understanding of what Ukraine is and what it isn't than the president does.
OR: Putin's claim that Ukraine is led by Nazis seems particularly weird, not least because many members of its leadership are Jewish.
Gabuev: Let's be clear. There are right-wing elements in Ukraine, nationalist battalions and stuff. The problem is that Putin's very myopic; he's obsessed with one part of the Ukrainian political landscape and doesn't look at the whole picture.
Another part of the problem involves a paradox: Putin understands China and the Arab world far better than he gets his own neighbors, particularly Ukraine. The reason is that when he is dealing with a Chinese leader, he'll say, “I don't understand the language. I don't understand the culture. I need somebody who is a professional China-watcher to help me understand what the hell is going on there.” Same with the Middle East. But when it comes to the United States and Europe, Putin—who speaks German, remember—will say, “Oh, we are Europeans ourselves, so we know them.” And he won't rely on real experts, which has led to a lot of misconceptions.
When it comes to Ukraine, it's even worse. The department of the Russian presidential administration that works on Ukraine stuff has always been the domestic unit. The diplomats have never been involved, and the quality of people working on Ukraine has been really terrible. They have all these misconceptions, because Russians and Ukrainians of Putin's generation used to be part of the same country. They are very, very similar. They are Soviet people by background, who watched the same movies, tell the same jokes. So when Putin has to deal with Ukraine, he doesn't turn to professionals and say, “Okay, what's going on?” And when people in Ukraine start to do strange things like speak Ukrainian or show a strong sense of Ukrainian identity, he says, “I know Ukraine. Ukraine is like us. This is something foreign, something imposed on them.”
That helps explain why the design of the operation was to make a surgical strike that would eliminate Ukraine's aerial defenses, destroy its command-and-control systems, target weapon depots and concentrations of Ukrainian troops. Putin thought this would make Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky run away to Washington, D.C. on Day One. He thought the Ukrainian army would be demoralized, and that part of the country would greet Russia with flowers and the other part would not resist. That was his theory. And he sought to minimize civilian casualties because he saw Ukrainians as our people and as pro-Russia. And there weren't enough Russian military officials involved in the planning who could ask, “Okay, what if that's not what happens? Are we ready to take big cities? Are we ready to occupy the country?” There was no plan B, no plan C.
OR: Even if that was the case, why didn't the Russian military leadership tell its conscripts that they were going to war in Ukraine rather than telling them they were just going to do exercises in Belarus—which led the situation where you have Russian kids who don't even know where they're fighting, let alone why?
Gabuev: Because of an obsession with operational security. As the leadership saw things, the fewer people who knew what the mission was, the better. And we have evidence that when, one day in advance, they finally did tell senior commanders what the ultimate mission was, many of them were visibly shaken and there was a lot of pushback. Because if you tell any sane Russian military person that their mission is to bombard Kiev to liberate it from Nazis, they'll know its nuts, right? So the morale was, and is, very low. No one was prepared, and that explains why the performance has been so bad.
That and the fact that it looks like the Russian military is just not as powerful as we thought. I have an explanation for that, too. Over the last 20-plus years, Putin has tried to professionalize the military but in a way that would ensure it wouldn't become a rival power center. Unlike in the U.S. military, where you have figures like General David Petraeus or General Stanley McChrystal, who are world class intellectually and were groomed to be senior statesmen, the majority of senior Russian commanders don't speak any foreign language and were never educated about how the outside world operates.
OR: How does the Russian public view the war? Do many Russians understand what's happening in Ukraine?
Gabuev: I think that the first reaction was shock, and people didn't understand what was going on. Propaganda is very efficient domestically. The Kremlin knocked out all sources of independent coverage. A lot of journalists have fled, because the government has criminalized independent coverage and anti-war slogans, which means you can now end up in prison for 15 years for saying the wrong thing. Meanwhile all of the TV channels, which is where most people get their news, are now repeating Putin's narrative, which is that the Ukrainian leaders are fascists and that they act like Hezbollah or Hamas and put their artillery inside maternity hospitals.
Most Russian people don't speak English or look at alternative sources of information. Only 16 percent of Russians even have passports, and only eight percent have travelled to countries that require a visa. So either they buy the government's line, or they prefer to look the other way
Now, the super-rich elite are terrified. A lot of them are now under sanction, and they're screwed. What can they do? Look at what happened in Hong Kong: half the city protested when Beijing imposed stricter control there, and it didn't stop President Xi. And Putin definitely won't hesitate to use bullets on protesters. So people who do object can either flee, or, if they're in the elite, they can say, “Okay, we've thrown in our lot with Putin, and as terrible as things are going to get, at least we'll be like the nomenklatura of North Korea or the revolutionary establishment of Iran. We have enough Château Margaux in our cellars, we have enough fancy wristwatches, we have enough Louis Vuitton luggage. So we'll live in Fortress Russia, and we'll support Putin, and we'll survive.”
As for educated class, the 20-to-30 percent of the population who are independent professional and not tied to the regime, most of them will flee. There will be a huge exodus of the best and the brightest. Most of my social circle has already emigrated. But there is not that much sympathy for Russians out there right now, so many people will stay.
OR: What do you make of the argument that this is the beginning of the end of Putin: that the war will inevitably get worse and worse, and when it does, the Russian people will turn against him?
Gabuev: We can't know, but I think there is high probability that this scenario is not realistic. If you look at Russia's demands in its negotiations with Ukraine, they tell you that Putin is not going to turn back. So if plan A doesn't work, and it hasn't, he is ready to turn Kiev and Kharkiv into Aleppo and Grozny. And then Russia will need to occupy Ukraine, because the moment Russian troops go home, whatever puppet government they've installed will be out. So Russia will occupy Ukraine, and there will be an Iraq-type insurgency, and ultimately this will end badly, because there is no way that Russia can occupy Ukraine forever. The problem here is that it can last for many years, like the U.S. operation in Afghanistan. But most of the Russian population won't protest the war.
OR: Even when Russian boys start coming home in body bags?
Gabuev: I don't think that will change things, because the regime will turn more and more repressive. We have many examples of how that works. Look at the Iran-Iraq war: that was really long and bloody, but the populations didn't turn against the dictatorships. The political opposition in Russia has been disassembled. The most active part of society will emigrate. And even if protests do pop up, the government will just take out bigger sticks.
On the economic front, the West talks about reducing dependency on Russian oil and gas. You can do that quickly if you are the United States or the United Kingdom, because they are not that dependent on Russian energy. But if you're the European Union, you simply can't do that overnight; it takes years. So as much as you hate the Kremlin, you'll need to keep a channel open to pay for their oil and gas. And because the shock of the war has sent energy prices through the roof, Russia will most likely build a huge current-account surplus this year, because while its imports are collapsing, the energy earnings are still there.
If you're the Russian government, and you also have really big earnings from selling oil and gas to Europe and to China, and all of your obligations are ruble denominated, and the ruble goes into freefall as it has, your state budget is far better off. Inflation will definitely go through the roof, but you will have enough money. People's quality of life will decrease dramatically, but you will have enough money to feed them, especially because Russia is sort of self-sufficient in food imports. The quality of food will get worse than it used to be, but still, people will have something to eat. People will have jobs. And the people will be afraid of your big sticks. So I think that the chances of Russia turning into a giant Iran and then into a giant North Korea are far more higher than a major pushback from the population.
Especially since the people who matter, the people with guns, have been very carefully selected for their loyalty. And the West has zero channels to talk to them and say, “Hey, if you remove Putin, you will be forgiven and you don't have to go to International Criminal Court in The Hague.”
OR: You've written that Putin's small group of trusted advisors actually benefits from conflict with the West. How so?
Gabuev: Well, they probably didn't envision the magnitude of the conflict and that Russia would be turned into a giant North Korea. But even if you are North Korea, while a lot of your people live in misery, some people still do well. Even if the pie shrinks, the elite still get the largest chunk. I think Russia's economy will become much more kind of state-led. But it will be led by friends of Putin, so net-net, they will be the beneficiaries of this very different new reality.
OR: Is there anything the West could have done in the years before the war that would have deterred Putin from invading? Like let's say that President Barack Obama had provided Ukraine with the lethal military assistance that it asked for; would that have made a difference?
Gabuev: It's very hard to say whether that would have deterred Putin or not. Closer cooperation with NATO was exactly what prompted this invasion, so I think doing more military would have been counterproductive.
The other option was for NATO to say out loud that yes, our doors are not shut, and every country (including Ukraine) has the right to choose its own alliances—but also that every alliance has the right to choose its members, and that Ukraine isn't a likely candidate, both because of Russia and because it's not ready. That might have helped. But this is a debate for historians. It's unfortunately irrelevant now.
OR: You're a China expert, so let's talk about that angle. Do you think Putin and his advisors realized how the crisis is going to change the power balance between Moscow and Beijing?
Gabuev: Again, they didn't envisage the magnitude of the war or of the Western response. They thought there would be some new sanctions and so some additional reliance on China, but not that much.
You have to understand what happened between 2014 and early 2022. After Russia invaded Ukraine the first time and Western sanctions were imposed, Moscow made an emotional pivot to Beijing. But China didn't then deliver as much as Russians had hoped for. So the early optimism turned to pessimism around mid-2015, and my contacts in government started to say, “We thought that China is our friend, but it's turned out to be very selfish.” But then there was a recognition that all great powers are selfish, and we shouldn't get emotional about it. There was a sense that China had not betrayed us, they are just doing what's right for them, just as we do what's right for us.
Around that time, I began arguing, both in private and in public, that the trendline is asymmetric: China is getting more leverage, and 10, 15 years, if things continue like they are—if we don't stabilize our relationship with the West, and if we don't make domestic structural reforms—China will be in a position to dictate the terms. For example, Beijing could say, “Hey, Russia, you still sell weapons to India? India is not friend of China, so you should stop.” But the response I often got from people in government was, “Sasha, in 2014, before the first Ukraine war, we were overly exposed to the West. Yet we were able to stand up and push back when we had to. Now China is more important, but it doesn't stand as tall as European Union did before Crimea. And we don't have political disagreements. So why would China be mean to us? They will definitely drive a hard bargain on commercial deals, but that's to be expected.”
OR: How have things changed since then?
Gabuev: Now it's a very different game, one that has not been anticipated by Putin and his entourage. And I think that China has chosen a very smart strategy. It has a template for how to react to moves that it cannot anticipate by Russia, which is often unpredictable and irrational in the Chinese view. That template was set by Crimea. When it was annexed sanctions were introduced, China said that it supports peace, it respects Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it never recognized Russia's annexation of Crimea. It may have criticized the unilateral American sanctions, but it also observed the letter of the sanctions. At the same time, however, it did everything it could to maximize its new opportunities in Russia.
That's very much what China will do now. China will criticize NATO expansion and U.S.-led military alliances, as we see it doing. As the situation on the ground gets more and more dire, they will add some talking points expressing sympathy toward the Ukrainian people. Critics will say, “Hasn't Putin violated the rules-based order that China has been profiting from for so many decades? And aren't respect for sovereignty and noninterference in others' affairs core values of Chinese foreign policy?” Well, China is a very selfish, very pragmatic great power. For China, noninterference means noninterference in China's affairs. China itself interferes in the affairs of is neighbors all the time—by imposing sanctions on South Korea and Australia, for example.
Meanwhile, China's relationship with Russia is very important to Beijing. Russia turning unstable or joining the pro-Western, anti-China camp would be a strategic nightmare. So Chinese leaders see a lot of opportunity right now. If the West says, “You should support us pushing back against Russia,” they'll say, “We support territorial integrity, noninterference, and peace.” If the West says, “What about Russia's threat to the U.S.-led rules-based international order?” China will say, “We support territorial integrity, noninterference, and peace.” They will observe the letter of the sanctions, because they don't want to further damage their relationship with the West. In the meantime, they'll watch from the sidelines as Russia's economy goes through free-fall. Only when Russia hits the bottom, and the active phase of war is over, and all the sanctions have been introduced and are rock solid, and the economic situation in Russia has become terrible as it's ever been—only then, when China can fully understand the situation, will it step in.
At that point, the opportunities for China will be enormous. Russia has long been reluctant to sell China its most sophisticated military technology. Well, guess what? Soon Moscow will have no other choice. Russia has also been reluctant to do a lot of deals in the renminbi, because it's not fully convertible. Now Russia won't have any other choice, and the renminbi will become the default currency of China-Russia trade. Those are byproducts of the war that Putin did not envisage.
OR: You're arguing that this new world is better for China in many ways. But isn't a less-peaceful world in which the global trading regime is threatened and the United States and Europe are reinvigorated actually bad for China?
Gabuev: Those parts are bad, but China doesn't have agency or control over Putin's decision making, so it has to adapt. It's like dealing with a hurricane or volcano. Meanwhile, China sees that the United States is distracted—this war will consume the rest of Biden's presidency. And if Biden isn't successful on delivering on his domestic agenda, the divisions and other domestic problems of the United States will only get worse. Those are big upsides for China.
OR: Can you imagine any situation where either Putin starts to seem so irrational and erratic, or the cost of supporting Russia gets so high, that China abandons it?
Gabuev: I don't think so. China will be super cautious and it won't openly support Russia's war. But a weaker Russia is a benefit to China, because China will gain much more control over their relationship.
OR: To return to Ukraine: can you imagine any deal with Kiev or the West to end the war that Putin would accept?
Gabuev: President Zelensky will not accept the maximalist deal that Putin is pushing now, because he knows that the moment he does, the popularity he's gained in the war will be destroyed. Ukraine is now hostage to its own propaganda. I think that many Ukrainians actually believe that they're winning the war and that if they don't stop Putin, they will all die. So they will not surrender. It's really tragic, but I don't think that they will accept a peace settlement that makes them semi-dependent on the aggressor, even if it saves their cities. The ugliest days of this war are in front of us, not behind us.
OR: Let's say you were given 15 minutes to offer President Biden advice on Russia policy right now. What would you say?
Gabuev: Look, I'm a Russian citizen and I'm a Russian patriot. It's tragic what's happening in Ukraine and it's a tragedy for my country too. On an emotional level, it's very hard to process. You cannot explain to yourself why Putin sees war as an instrument to achieve Russia's foreign policy goals in Ukraine. It's unfathomable because the downsides are just so obvious. They are obvious to everybody, so why would you start this?
It's heartbreaking to see Kyiv, the city where my mother was born and where I spent part of my childhood and where many of my friends still are, be destroyed by Russian bombs. They are our closest kin. There are so many personal links. It's tragic, but I don't want to give President Biden advice on how to squeeze my own country.
Source：The Octavian Report 2022.3.14.
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