During the critical tariffs' moment, Xi Jinping went invisible again

by ELM

Chinese version/中文版

【1】

Recently, news about the Trump administration in the US imposing tariffs on countries around the world has been a constant hot topic, such as the latest news that the White House announced a 104% tariff rate on China:

White House spokesperson Levitt: The US has officially imposed an additional 50% tariff on Chinese goods, bringing the total tariff rate to a record-breaking 104%. There will also be a series of new trade restriction measures that will take effect on April 9. This is consistent with the threat Trump made on Truth Social yesterday: if China does not withdraw the 34% retaliatory tariff announced last Friday by Tuesday or before, the US will implement an additional 50% punitive tariff on Wednesday, together with the 20% tariff already in place, making it a total of 104%.

Moreover, Trump also announced that China-US trade negotiations will be completely terminated, and all meeting arrangements with Beijing will be canceled.

China has taken a confrontational stance in response. The spokesperson of the Ministry of Commerce stated: The US has threatened to further impose a 50% tariff on China, and China firmly opposes this. If the US escalates its tariff measures, China will resolutely take countermeasures to safeguard its own interests... If the US insists on going its own way, China will fight to the end.

【2】

In addition to heating the discussion on the current tariff issue, this news also has another highlight - something that many Twitter "Zhongnanhai gossipers" like to bring up: At this critical moment in China-US economic and trade relations, a key juncture in the direction of the global economy, and a focus of global public opinion, where is Xi Jinping? the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the President of the People's Republic of China, why has he gone invisible up till now for so many days?

Searching for news about Xi Jinping, the only appearance is a news report on April 3rd about him participating in a tree planting event:

Apart from this, Xi Jinping has not made any statements on the tariff issue, nor has there been any reports of him appearing in public or attending any meetings. There are only the routine news about Xi Jinping's ideological study.

In a word, Xi Jinping has once again gone invisible at a critical moment.

This latest disappearance at a critical moment naturally leads the "Zhongnanhai gossipers" on Twitter to speculate again about the dynamics in Zhongnanhai and issues regarding Xi Jinping himself. The main guesses are in two directions:

One is the power fights within the military led by Xi Jinping, from the purges of Li Shangfu/李尚福, Wei Fenghe/魏凤和, and Ding Laihang/丁来杭 last year, to the recent cases of He Weidong/何卫东 and Lin Xiangyang/林向阳, the intense power fights among the various factions in the military have been ongoing. Xi Jinping's invisibility is most likely due to him dealing with the power fights within the military.

The second is Xi Jinping's own health problems. In fact, Xi Jinping's health issues have been a hot topic of discussion whenever he goes invisible, including speculations that he is sick, has had a stroke, or has cerebrovascular tumors, and even the possibility of an ambulance following him when he appear in public.

【3】

Both of these speculations have their merits, but from Xi Jinping's habitual behavior, his disappearance at critical moments is already his standard operating procedure. Because these are critical moments for the common people, but not for Xi Jinping.

The common people are concerned about their livelihoods, while Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership are concerned about their own power and authority.

This habit has been around for a long time.

At the end of 2022, the over-strict COVID-19 prevention policy that had lasted for three years could no longer be sustained. Starting from the Urumqi fire, various forms of protests against "dynamic zero-COVID" and "lockdowns" quickly spread across the country. After People's Daily and Xinhua published commentaries advocating "strategic composure" and insisting on dynamic zero-COVID, suddenly in mid-December, without any forewarning or public announcement, all lockdown and over-strict prevention measures were abruptly canceled overnight, and various isolation barriers and nucleic acid testing booths were gradually dismantled. China completed the transition from over-strict prevention to full reopening in one night. During this period, Xi Jinping, who had "personally commanded and deployed the epidemic prevention work," never made any public statements, not even the CCP leadership.

Even for the nationwide epidemic, Xi Jinping could pretend to be blind and treat it as none of his business. Let alone the tariff issue, which has always been something he has been indifferent to. Life and death, illness - these are just trivial matters for the common people, not even worth the consideration of a dictator like Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping has made some remarks about caring for people's livelihoods before, but those were just empty talk. If you take them seriously, then you are just too naive.

【4】

A quick search reveals numerous public statements from the foreign leaders on the tariff war during this period (only listing the headlines of the major parties involved):

Japan: Ishiba Shigeru agrees with Trump to continue tariff negotiations

South Korea: Acting President of South Korea denies possibility of joint retaliation with China and Japan against US tariffs

Vietnam: Vietnamese leader Tô Lâm requests the US to postpone tariff imposition by at least 45 days

UK: UK Prime Minister pledges to intervene to protect companies affected by tariffs

Germany: German Chancellor: We will resolutely respond to US tariff measures

Italy: Italian Prime Minister: Ready to use all necessary means to deal with US tariffs

France: Macron calls for European unity to suspend investment in the US in response to "arrogant" tariff policy

Canada (partially exempted): Canadian Prime Minister: Will retaliate against US tariff policy

Mexico (partially exempted): Mexican President says will consider tariffs on China

In contrast, Xi Jinping has not uttered a single word during this more than 10-day period, and he cannot even be found. As for the Premier of the State Council, Li Qiang, he did make a public statement, but it was not a proactive statement. It was just a passive remark made "during a phone call with European Commission President von der Leyen," saying that "China has sufficient policy tools to hedge against external adverse impacts." Apart from that, he has not said a word. In other words, if von der Leyen had not called Li Qiang, Li Qiang probably would not have said anything at all. Considering that Li Qiang no longer dares to hold a press conference even during the Two Sessions, this reaction is quite understandable.

Going back to the two speculations of the Twitter "Zhongnanhai gossipers", whether Xi Jinping is busy dealing with power fights or resting his body, it shows that the tariff issue is far from being on his radar.

Without delving into grand narratives, the difference between foreign countries (even countries like Vietnam that still have remnants of communism) and China is the difference between a normal country and a dictatorship, the difference between a democratically elected leader and a leader selected by a dictatorship. The basic operating mode of a democratically elected leader is to care for their constituents, while a dictator only cares about their own power.

Many pro-CCP troll army members love to ask: What's the use of democracy? What's the use of discussing politics? Can it bring you food? The resounding answer from the currently invisible Xi Jinping is: Democracy is certainly useful, discussing politics is also useful. Democratic countries may not necessarily be superior, but they can at least ensure that the leaders you elect are concerned about your food issues, rather than just caring about their own power privilege. 

Stock market strategy: What's next?

by SIG

Chinese version/中文版

The Chinese stock market (Shanghai and Shenzhen) suddenly gained momentum from the end of September, experiencing a rapid surge, setting new records in trading volume, price gains, and turnover rates that had not been seen in many years:

So, based on the current standpoint, how will the future trend of the A-shares market be?

P1

To judge the future trend of the A-shares market, we should first briefly understand the reasons behind the sudden "mini-bull market" in the A-shares this time:

first, The decision-makers now have a relatively unified view on the current economic situation in China: The current economic situation in China is worrying, and the "chill" has reached the highest bureau. Against the backdrop of sluggish global economic recovery and insufficient domestic consumer demand, the decision-makers have realized that the economic conditions are much worse than publicly proclaimed. The downward pressure on the domestic economy has been gradually increasing, and major economic indicators such as industry, investment, and consumption have seen significant fluctuations since the third quarter, urgently needing effective measures to rescue the economy.

In this broader context, the Chinese government has quietly changed the wording in official documents from "resolutely completing" to "strive to complete" [economic targets]:

This clearly indicates that China's stance on achieving the GDP growth target of around 5% has weakened, implying that the general expectation is that this year's target will be difficult to achieve. This tone-setting comes directly from the highest level, intended to signal to the departments responsible for actual policy formulation and the market that a loosening of policies is needed.

Secondly, in terms of specific macroeconomic policies, the People's Bank of China has rolled out monetary policy measures at a very fast pace, including both interest rate cuts and reserve requirement ratio (RRR) reductions:

On September 27th, the People's Bank of China issued an announcement on open market operations, lowering the 7-day reverse repo operation interest rate by 0.2 percentage points, from the previous 1.7% to 1.5%. At the same time, the central bank decided to reduce the deposit reserve requirement ratio for financial institutions by 0.5 percentage points (excluding those already implementing a 5% deposit reserve requirement) starting from September 27th, 2024.

The simultaneous interest rate cut and RRR reduction have provided the market with ample liquidity, laying the foundation for the A-share rally.

Thirdly, the rollout of fiscal policy measures has been relatively slower, but continues to be ramped up:

On October 8th, after working overtime during the recent national holiday, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) held a press conference and announced a series of fiscal measures: strengthening the countercyclical adjustment of macroeconomic policies, expanding domestic effective demand, increasing support and assistance for enterprises, stabilizing the real estate market, and boosting the capital market, among others.

However, the October 8th press conference fell short of market expectations, and the stock market showed signs of a corresponding decline. Likely aware that the NDRC's press conference did not achieve the desired effect, the decision-makers hastily announced that another press conference led by the Ministry of Finance will be held on Saturday (October 12th), where a series of fiscal policy measures will be announced.

P2

So, what was the ignition point for this latest A-share rally, given the foundation of liquidity and policy expectations? It was the statement made by the People's Bank of China on September 24th. Some netizens jokingly referred to this as the "central bank directly joining the stock market frenzy":

On September 24th, the People's Bank of China announced the creation of two new structural monetary policy tools:

"The first one is to establish a securities, fund, and insurance company swap facility, supporting eligible securities, fund, and insurance companies in obtaining liquidity from the central bank through asset pledging.

The second one is to create a special relending facility for stock repurchases and additional purchases, guiding banks to provide loans to listed companies and major shareholders to support stock repurchases and additional purchases."

This is the maximum supportive measure that the central bank can take for the A-share market within the scope of the People's Bank of China Law. In a slightly loose summary, this means that the central bank is directly injecting liquidity into the A-share market. People's Bank of China Governor Pan Gongsheng revealed that they can set up at least three 500 billion yuan facilities, and this 1.5 trillion yuan can only be invested in stocks, which is very different from previous practices.

With the central bank's endorsement, the A-share market saw a 4.15% (Shanghai Composite Index) surge on September 24th, kicking off this latest mini-bull market.

P3

So, will the A-share market see a true bull market? It's quite difficult.

A bull market requires the coordination of several factors: strong economic growth, good corporate profitability and growth prospects, the coordination of government monetary and fiscal policies, the restoration of investor confidence and market sentiment, and the easing of external market pressures (such as a U.S. dollar interest rate cut cycle), and so on.

Most of these conditions are not optimistic, and the market performance of the A-shares on the 11th even indicated that the market's expectations for the Ministry of Finance's press conference on the 12th are not high.

Because this latest bull run is essentially just a "mini-bull market" driven purely by liquidity, the rapid rise will bring bubble risks and can also trigger irrational behavior from investors, exacerbating market volatility. If the earnings outlook and economic fundamentals of companies do not keep up, it is very likely to lead to a major correction.

The best case scenario is that the decision-makers gradually control the market sentiment, on the one hand, continuously using positive policies to stimulate the market, emphasizing that the return to solid economic fundamentals takes time, and on the other hand, able to get positive feedback from the listed companies, with their profitability truly improving, to stabilize market expectations. At the same time, guide incremental funds to continue flowing in, using the incremental funds and improved corporate earnings to absorb the current market rally.

P4

The above was discussing the best-case scenario.

Specifically, regarding the future trend of the A-share market, it is predicted that in the case of a lack of new incremental funds, the market index has already reached a high point, and there is not much room for further upside. Subsequently, there may be rotational increases and decreases among different sectors. The probability of the various indices going down or remaining flat is higher than going up.

For retail investors, if you have not entered the market yet, it is advised not to consider doing so now. If you have already entered and are unwilling to exit, you can consider reducing your position size, controlling your stock portfolio, and removing any leverage. The most important thing is: do not use your daily living expenses to speculate in the stock market.

For fund investors, you may want to consider gradually redeeming your holdings. Because for the foreseeable future, there may not be such good opportunities to recoup your investment again.

There is a historical fact to keep in mind: The first half of 2015 saw a frenetic bull market, but from January 1 to June 30, 2015, the returns of all equity funds were lower than those of Yu'e Bao (a popular money market fund) over the same period.

Risk reminder: Fiscal policy falling short of expectations, low efficiency in policy implementation.

================================

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不构成投资建议
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All rights reserved
No investment advice
©Sunshine Intelligence Group
Contact for more customized research reports

Comments on the NDRC meeting on Oct. 8th: Looks like a feast, but where to begin?

by SIG

Chinese version/中文版

On the morning of Tuesday, October 8th at 10 AM, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) held a State Council press conference. NDRC chairman Zheng Zhaojie and four deputy chairmen appeared collectively. Compared to previous press conferences held by the State Council Information Office, the attendance of "one chairman and four deputies" is relatively rare, indicating that the NDRC has recognized the grave situation of economic decline and lack of confidence.

Throughout the press conference, the NDRC made deployments regarding government investment, the direction of special debt investment, policies to boost consumption and benefit people's livelihoods, and the development of the private economy. The overall tone of the meeting was positive, but there was little emphasis on the actual implementation level, and it still requires the support and coordination of executable fiscal policies.

P1

The policy tone expressed in this NDRC press conference is consistent with the September Politburo meeting: it acknowledges that the current situation has become more complex and severe with increasing downward pressure on the domestic economy. The main economic indicators such as industry, investment, and consumption have fluctuated since the third quarter. At the same time, it repeatedly emphasizes that "there are conditions, abilities, and more confidence to achieve the expected goals for the annual economic and social development." It clearly expresses a positive attitude to "strive to achieve the economic growth target."

The specific measures include five aspects: 1) Increasing counter-cyclical macro-policy adjustments, 2) Expanding domestic effective demand, 3) Strengthening assistance and support for enterprises, 4) Promoting the real estate market to stop the decline and stabilize, and 5) Boosting the capital market.

Accelerated deployment of government investment: In terms of new funds, the most clear increment is that 200 billion yuan will be allocated to local investment projects by the end of this month to support their early implementation, involving areas such as "ongoing infrastructure, urbanization of agricultural transfer population, high-standard farmland construction, underground pipe network construction, and urban renewal." According to the report, the invested and planned projects are all at the trillion-level. However, the problem is that the current 50-58% of the projects have not yet started, and they need to start quickly within this year to form workload.

Expanding the use of special bonds: Measures will be taken as soon as possible to reasonably expand the scope of local government special bond support, accelerate the issuance of the remaining 290 billion yuan of special bonds by the end of this year, and expand the financing role of new PPP mechanisms and infrastructure REITs. This is obviously empowering local governments and expanding their financing channels. However, given the huge total local debt and relatively low investment returns, whether local governments can improve management, use funds reasonably, and select projects properly, the execution details need further observation.

Regarding the support for people's livelihoods, the press conference mentioned that some preferential tax and fee policies are expected to continue. However, considering the background of delayed retirement, the fiscal capacity to make up for the shortfall is clearly declining. It is not optimistic whether the policies supporting unemployment insurance, stabilizing employment, and skills upgrade subsidies that will expire at the end of this year can be continued.

In addition, there are also statements to support the development of the private economy and boost market confidence: The press conference stated that "the legislative process of the Promotion of Private Enterprises Law will be accelerated, the law enforcement and supervision of enterprises will be standardized, and there should be no illegal cross-regional law enforcement and profit-driven law enforcement, as well as random fines, inspections, and seizures." This is the voice of "private enterprises and entrepreneurs are our own people, and we must help enterprises overcome difficulties." However, the actual implementation effect is worrying.

In terms of boosting consumption and stabilizing the real estate market, there is a statement of "using special bonds to activate idle land." This part is rather abstract and lacks specific implementation. However, this is the most important part for people's livelihoods. Among the three major economic drivers, net exports are fluctuating, and investment has also lost its pillar role. The market consensus is to enhance household consumption, but the NDRC did not provide the strong answers the market expected in this regard.

P2

Overall, the tone of this NDRC press conference is about "aggressive fiscal expansion policies, leveraging up, pushing forward relevant government investment projects, as well as policies to benefit people's livelihoods and boost consumption."

However, upon closer examination, this NDRC press conference is clearly below market expectations and seems quite rushed. This is reflected in the following aspects:

1, Overly broad and superficial, with more talk than substance and insufficient preparation for implementation details. Although the press conference had a high-level lineup, it touched on many topics but remained superficial, making implementation difficult. For example, in the area of government investment, while it announced details of local investment projects, there was no concrete progress on actual project implementation.

2, Avoiding specific figures and targets. This clearly indicates a lack of thorough homework, failure to coordinate with various departments and local governments, and possibly even a lack of endorsement from the top of the State Council. This is evident in the questions from the Reuters reporter (excerpt from the meeting transcript).

Overall, the NDRC's approach in this press conference seems to be more about making a strong statement through high-profile messaging, rather than providing solid, executable policies and implementation plans that the market had expected:

[Reuters reporter's question: I would like to ask, what is the estimated scale of this package of policies, and what are the targets we need to achieve? Will the economic growth target of around 5% this year be achieved? Will the current deflationary pressures facing the economy be alleviated? Thank you. (2024-10-08 11:17:05)

Zheng Zhaojie: Thank you for your question. Please let my colleague, Deputy Director Zhao Chenxin, answer this question. (2024-10-08 11:17:21)

NDRC Deputy Director Zhao Chenxin:

Thank you for the question from the Reuters reporter. The answers to the questions you are concerned about can be found in the content that Chairman Zheng just reported. For example, the research and formulation of this package of incremental policies reflects the "three more emphasis" and "four insistences" - that is, to place more emphasis on the quality of economic development, more emphasis on supporting the healthy development of the real economy and business entities, and more emphasis on coordinating high-quality development and high-level security; insist on goal-oriented, problem-oriented, and systematic approach, as well as combining short-term and long-term measures. Chairman Zheng's report also mentioned many key words, such as the package of incremental policies being comprehensive and systematic, and in the process of implementation, the need to improve the pertinence and precision, enhance the effectiveness and sustainability. As long as we grasp these core contents, we will be able to understand and grasp the package of incremental policies well. The purpose of the package of incremental policies is to fully stimulate the proactiveness, initiative and creativity of the whole society in promoting high-quality development, and to promote the economy to continue to rebound and improve.

In the first half of this year, China's economic growth rate was 5%, with employment and prices remaining basically stable. Today is October 8th, and the first three quarters have passed. From the information we have, China's economy in the first three quarters has maintained an overall stable and progressive development trend. With the implementation of the Party Central Committee and the State Council's various policy decisions, especially as the effects of the package of incremental policies continue to emerge, the vitality and driving force of development will be further released, market confidence will be further enhanced, and the foundation for high-quality development and the stable operation of the economy will be further consolidated. We have the conditions, capabilities, and more confidence to achieve the expected goals for the annual economic and social development.]说了很多，但其实什么也没说，以至于网上有人把这段对话总结为：

It is clear that this meeting was purely for the purpose of appeasing the market and "boosting market confidence", rather than truly announcing major fiscal measures.

3, Consistent with the previous point, the entire press conference was filled with a lot of uncertain phrases such as "will", "will study", "to be studied", "have confidence", which proves that the NDRC itself does not have a definite direction and policy recommendations. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the subsequent extensive commentary, there are also many evasive phrases such as "expected to", "will", "believe".

Given these three points, it is understandable why the effect of this meeting fell short of market expectations.

The NDRC's approach seems to be more focused on making a strong statement through high-profile messaging, rather than providing solid, executable policies and implementation plans that the market had expected. The extensive use of uncertain language and lack of concrete details suggest the NDRC itself may not have a clear, coordinated plan ready for immediate implementation. This has resulted in the meeting falling short of the market's desired response to the economic challenges.。

P3

At the time of publishing this article, a newly update information has been received:

It is reported that the State Council Information Office will hold a press conference at 10 AM on Saturday, October 12, 2024, where the Minister of Finance, Lan Fuan, will be introduced to discuss "increasing the counter-cyclical adjustment strength of fiscal policy and promoting high-quality economic development", and take questions from reporters.

It is suggested that the Ministry of Finance should prepare well for the upcoming meeting. If it is similar to the October 8th meeting, then it would reveal the true nature of the Chinese leadership's policymaking - being at a loss.

Risk alert: Low efficiency of policy implementation, and monetary policy of major economies exceeding expectations.

================================

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©阳光资讯
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All rights reserved
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Ukraine's Three-to-One Advantage

It's not technology or tactics that has given Ukrainian fighters their greatest edge.

By Elliot Ackerman

Marcus Yam / Los Angeles Times / Getty

About the author: Elliot Ackerman is the author, most recently, of the novel Red Dress in Black and White and a co-author of the novel 2034. He is a former Marine and intelligence officer who served five tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A few nights ago in Lviv, after an early dinner (restaurants shut at 8 p.m. because of curfew), I stepped into the elevator of my hotel. I was chatting with a colleague when a man in early middle age, dressed and equipped like a backpacker, thrust his hand into the closing door. “You guys American?” he asked. I told him we were, and as he reached for the elevator button, I couldn't help but notice his dirty hands and the half-moons of filth beneath each fingernail. I also noticed his fleece. It had an eagle, a globe, and an anchor embossed on its left breast. “You a Marine?” I asked. He said he was (or had been—once a Marine, always a Marine), and I told him that I'd served in the Marines too.

He introduced himself (he's asked that I not use his name, so let's just call him Jed), and we did a quick swap of bona fides, exchanging the names of the units in which we'd both served as infantrymen a decade ago. Jed asked if I knew where he could get a cup of coffee, or at least a cup of tea. He had, after a 10-hour journey, only just arrived from Kyiv. He was tired and cold, and everything was closed.

A little cajoling persuaded the hotel restaurant to boil Jed a pot of water and hand him a few tea bags. When I wished him a good night, he asked if I wanted some tea too. The way he asked—like a kid pleading for a last story before bed—persuaded me to stay a little while longer. He wanted someone to talk with.

As Jed sat across from me in the empty restaurant, with his shoulders hunched forward over the table and his palms cupped around the tea, he explained that since arriving in Ukraine at the end of February, he had been fighting as a volunteer along with a dozen other foreigners outside Kyiv. The past three weeks had marked him. When I asked how he was holding up, he said the combat had been more intense than anything he'd witnessed in Afghanistan. He seemed conflicted, as if he wanted to talk about this experience, but not in terms that could turn emotional. Perhaps to guard against this, he began to discuss the technical aspects of what he'd seen, explaining in granular detail how the outmanned, outgunned Ukrainian military had fought the Russians to a standstill.

First, Jed wanted to discuss anti-armor weapons, particularly the American-made Javelin and the British-made NLAW. The past month of fighting had demonstrated that the balance of lethality had shifted away from armor, and toward anti-armor weapons. Even the most advanced armor systems, such as the Russian T-90 series main battle tank, had proved vulnerable, their charred husks littering Ukrainian roadways.

When I mentioned to Jed that I'd fought in Fallujah in 2004, he said that the tactics the Marine Corps used to take that city would never work today in Ukraine. In Fallujah, our infantry worked in close coordination with our premier tank, the M1A2 Abrams. On several occasions, I watched our tanks take direct hits from rocket-propelled grenades (typically older-generation RPG-7s) without so much as a stutter in their forward progress. Today, a Ukrainian defending Kyiv or any other city, armed with a Javelin or an NLAW, would destroy a similarly capable tank.

If the costly main battle tank is the archetypal platform of an army (as is the case for Russia and NATO), then the archetypal platform of a navy (particularly America's Navy) is the ultra-costly capital ship, such as an aircraft carrier. Just as modern anti-tank weapons have turned the tide for the outnumbered Ukrainian army, the latest generation of anti-ship missiles (both shore- and sea-based) could in the future—say, in a place like the South China Sea or the Strait of Hormuz—turn the tide for a seemingly outmatched navy. Since February 24, the Ukrainian military has convincingly displayed the superiority of an anti-platform-centric method of warfare. Or, as Jed put it, “In Afghanistan, I used to feel jealous of those tankers, buttoned up in all that armor. Not anymore.”

This brought Jed to the second subject he wanted to discuss: Russian tactics and doctrine. He said he had spent much of the past few weeks in the trenches northwest of Kyiv. “The Russians have no imagination,” he said. “They would shell our positions, attack in large formations, and when their assaults failed, do it all over again. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians would raid the Russian lines in small groups night after night, wearing them down.” Jed's observation echoed a conversation I'd had the day before with Andriy Zagorodnyuk. After Russia's invasion of the Donbas in 2014, Zagorodnyuk oversaw a number of reforms to the Ukrainian military that are now bearing fruit, chief among them changes in Ukraine's military doctrine; then, from 2019 to 2020, he served as minister of defense.

Russian doctrine relies on centralized command and control, while mission-style command and control—as the name suggests—relies on the individual initiative of every soldier, from the private to the general, not only to understand the mission but then to use their initiative to adapt to the exigencies of a chaotic and ever-changing battlefield in order to accomplish that mission. Although the Russian military has modernized under Vladimir Putin, it has never embraced the decentralized mission-style command-and-control structure that is the hallmark of NATO militaries, and that the Ukrainians have since adopted.

“The Russians don't empower their soldiers,” Zagorodnyuk explained. “They tell their soldiers to go from Point A to Point B, and only when they get to Point B will they be told where to go next, and junior soldiers are rarely told the reason they are performing any task. This centralized command and control can work, but only when events go according to plan. When the plan doesn't hold together, their centralized method collapses. No one can adapt, and you get things like 40-mile-long traffic jams outside Kyiv.”

Eliot A. Cohen: Why can't the West admit Ukraine is winning?

The individual Russian soldier's lack of knowledge corresponded with a story Jed told me, one that drove home the consequences of this lack of knowledge on the part of individual Russian soldiers. During a failed night assault on his trench, a group of Russian soldiers got lost in the nearby woods. “Eventually, they started calling out,” he said. “I couldn't help it; I felt bad. They had no idea where to go.”

When I asked what happened to them, he returned a grim look.

Instead of recounting that part of the story, he described the advantage Ukrainians enjoy in night-vision technology. When I told him I'd heard the Ukrainians didn't have many sets of night-vision goggles, he said that was true, and that they did need more. “But we've got Javelins. Everyone's talking about the Javelins as an anti-tank weapon, but people forget that the Javelins also have a CLU.”

The CLU, or command launch unit, is a highly capable thermal optic that can operate independent of the missile system. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we would often carry at least one Javelin on missions, not because we expected to encounter any al-Qaeda tanks, but because the CLU was such an effective tool. We'd use it to watch road intersections and make sure no one was laying down IEDs. The Javelin has a range in excess of a mile, and the CLU is effective at that distance and beyond.

I asked Jed at what ranges they were engaging the Russians. “Typically, the Ukrainians would wait and ambush them pretty close.” When I asked how close, he answered, “Sometimes scary close.” He described one Ukrainian, a soldier he and a few other English speakers had nicknamed “Maniac” because of the risks he'd take engaging Russian armor. “Maniac was the nicest guy, totally mild-mannered. Then in a fight, the guy turned into a psycho, brave as hell. And then after a fight, he'd go right back to being this nice, mild-mannered guy.”

I wasn't in a position to verify anything Jed told me, but he showed me a video he'd taken of himself in a trench, and based on that and details he provided about his time in the Marines, his story seemed credible. The longer we talked, the more the conversation veered away from the tangible, technical variables of Ukraine's military capacity and toward the psychology of Ukraine's military. Napoleon, who fought many battles in this part of the world, observed that “the moral is to the physical as three is to one.” I was thinking of this maxim as Jed and I finished our tea.

In Ukraine—at least in this first chapter of the war—Napoleon's words have held true, proving in many ways decisive. In my earlier conversation with Zagorodnyuk, as he and I went through the many reforms and technologies that had given the Ukrainian military its edge, he was quick to point out the one variable he believed trumped all others. “Our motivation—it is the most important factor, more important than anything. We're fighting for the lives of our families, for our people, and for our homes. The Russians don't have any of that, and there's nowhere they can go to get it.”

Elliot Ackerman is the author, most recently, of the novel Red Dress in Black and White and a co-author of the novel 2034. He is a former Marine and intelligence officer who served five tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Economist: A question of judgment

A question of judgment
A managerial quality that is hard to define but important to possess

Jul 18th 2020 edition

The pandemic has required many people to make difficult judgments. Politicians have had to decide which restrictions to impose on citizens' behaviour and individuals were forced to assess how much personal risk to take. Managers, faced with tough calls like which parts of their operations to close, have not been spared.

Good judgment is a quality everyone would like to have. But it is remarkably difficult to define precisely, and many people are not sure whether they personally possess it. Sir Andrew Likierman of the London Business School has spent a long time talking to leaders in a wide range of fields, from business and the army to the law and medicine, in an effort to create a framework for understanding judgment.

First he had to define the word. He suggests that judgment is “the combination of personal qualities with relevant knowledge and experience to form opinions and take decisions”. And he argues that, thus defined, judgment involves a process—taking in information, deciding whom and what to trust, summarising one's personal knowledge, checking any prior beliefs or feelings, summarising the available choices and then making the decision. At each stage, decision-makers must ask themselves questions, such as whether they have the relevant experience and expertise to make their choice, and whether the option they favour is practical.

Expertise can be useful in making judgments. But it is not the same thing. “Academics have expertise,” Sir Andrew observes. “They don't necessarily have judgment.” People with judgment know when they are out of their depth in making a decision and typically then seek the advice of someone who has the right background and knowledge.

It is, of course, possible to follow all these steps and still make the wrong choice. But Sir Andrew argues that a sensible process improves the chance of getting it right. The temptation is to look at people's track records when assessing when they have good judgment, but luck may have played a huge part. “While good judgment is important to success,” Sir Andrew cautions, “success is not a signal that there has been good judgment.”

The degree of judgment required tends to increase as people take on more responsibility. Those with routine tasks generally have limited scope for judgment. Line supervisors have some discretion. For a chief executive, the proportion of decisions involving judgment is high. Deciding not to take action is also a judgment with potentially serious consequences (for example, “I won't get vaccinated” or “I won't pay my bills”). The world is full of people whose lack of judgment brought their careers or personal life crashing down. Many made the common mistake of assuming everything was fine.

Some people think that good judgment is innate. Sir Andrew accepts that some individuals are born with the ability to listen, be self-aware and better understand other people: all qualities that make good judgment easier. People with good judgment tend to have a breadth of experiences and relationships that enables them to recognise parallels or analogies that others miss. The ability to be detached, both intellectually and emotionally, is also a vital component.

Others may have the wrong sort of characteristics; a tendency to ignore others, stick to rules irrespective of context, rush into action without reflection and struggle to make up their minds. Many leaders make bad judgments because they unconsciously filter the information they receive or are not sufficiently critical of what they hear or read. The danger is that people ignore insights that they don't want to hear, a tendency that can increase with age.

As artificial intelligence gets used for more and more routine tasks in the service sector, exercising judgment may be one area where humans retain an edge over machines. This is far from certain, however. What people perceive as good judgment may stem from the ability to spot certain cues in the environment. This ability may be unconscious, just as a dog can catch a Frisbee in mid-air without knowing how to calculate wind speed and air resistance.

With enough practice, machines may be able to recognise these implicit cues and thus display the equivalent of good judgment. But then, perhaps humans can be taught, too. In the long run one of the trickiest aspects of human judgment may be knowing precisely when to let machines take decisions and when to leave it to people.

This article appeared in the Business section of the print edition under the headline "A question of judgment"

成年人打卡学英语效果如何？

作为一个成年人，开始学习英语还赶趟吗？

编者按：人们一直以来都认为小孩子学外语会比成年人学的更快更好，但MIT的科学家告诉我们：并不是这样，成年人比小孩子学语言更快。每天在朋友圈打卡学英语的你们，看完文章一定备受鼓舞。本文译自Medium原标题为" MIT Scientists prove adults learn language to fluency nearly as well as children"的文章，希望对您有所启发。

最近发表在《认知》杂志上一篇新题为《第二语言学习的关键期》（A Critical Period for Second Language Acquisition）的论文使用了一种新的Facebook-quiz-powered的方法收集一个庞大的语言数据集，研究了人类学习语言的特征，以及年龄对学习语言的过程中产生的影响。

简而言之，这个研究小组发现，如果你在18岁之前开始学习一门语言，那么你就更有可能像母语人士一样掌握这门语言的语法。这个年龄比人们通常认为的要大得多，这很有趣，我待会再讲原因。

这些数据也让我们对语言学习有了更深入的了解，并表明任何年龄的成年人都能像孩子一样快速掌握语言。

不幸的是，许多记者错误地解读了这篇论文，提出了另一种误导的观点：“作为一个成年人，流利地使用另一种语言可能是无法实现的”，而事实恰恰相反。如果你看到一篇文章说，你需要在10岁之前开始学习一门语言才能达到流利使用，那这个报告一定是没有好好进行研究。事实要比这有趣得多，也鼓舞人心得多。

我们知道这些是因为研究人员发布了他们基于这篇论文的整个数据集，让我们一起来看看，这些有趣的数据向我们展示了关于学习语言的秘密，如果你是一个成年人，看完一定备受鼓舞。

许多年龄大的语言学习者也能达到母语水平

通过这些数据，我们很明显可以发现，尽早开始学习有统计学上的优势。如果你比较一下在不同年龄开始学习的学生的平均成绩，你会发现早一点开始学习有明显的优势。

纵轴是准确性，横轴是学习经验年数，左边是浸入式学习者(A)，右边是和非浸入式学习者(B)。

然而，如果更仔细地观察那些20岁以后才开始学习外语的学生的数据，就会发现，有很多晚学英语的人表现得比许多以英语为母语的人更好。

首先，我们需要在这个测试中指定什么是“母语水平”。对于以英语为母语的组别来说，测试结果我们有一个范围，从100%到90%，有12%的母语为英语的人得分达到了100%，而最差的后5%达到了90%的得分。这表明在测试中得分超过90%即意味着你的表现至少和许多母语人士一样好。

许多文章都骇人听闻地说，如果你从10岁(或18岁，视文章而定)以后开始学习，就不可能达到母语水平，但这是真的吗?当然，平均而言，开始学习的年龄越大，似乎拥有学习的时间就更少，但达到母语水平就真的是不可能的吗?

数据告诉我们事实并非如此。当然，平均来说可能性不大，但是有成千上万的人参加了这个测试的人都得到了与母语者相同的分数，而且他们都是在20岁以后才开始学习这门语言的。

我们先不去看这个晚学习群体的中位数，只关注那些20岁以后才开始学习的群体的前四分之一。我们可以根据他们开始学习这门语言的时间来调整图表。

在20岁以后开始学习的学生中，学习年限最高的四分之一显示，在大约8-10年的受教育年限里，许多在成年后开始学习的学生和许多以英语为母语的人一样好。纵轴0.9以上的所有人都表示能达到母语水平。

这里我们可以看到，许多较晚开始学习的学习者的得分都在以英语为母语的人的范围内(在0.9线以上)。事实上，如果我们把20岁以后开始的学习者前四分之一的学生的成绩与其他组(5岁之前、10岁之前和20岁之前开始学习的学生)的中值绘制成图表，结果看起来并没有多大不同。

20岁以上才开始学习的学习者与5岁(红色)、10岁(黄色)、20岁(绿色)前开始学习的学生成绩比较

在相同的时间内，20岁以上的学生中，表现的最好的四分之一和10岁之前开始学习的学生的平均水平一样好。

(在大约20年的学习经历后，20岁以上开始学习的人群表现变得不稳定，这是因为可供使用的数据越来越少，毕竟从20岁开始学习，加上20年的学习经历，最少也得有40岁了)。

为何拿中值和前四分之一比？

但我们为什么要取前四分之一呢？我们不应该比较所有组的中值吗，就像第一个图一样？难道我们不应该做同类比较吗？把一个组的中值和另一个组的前四分之一进行比较不公平吧?

之所以这么做的原因在于，没有办法用这个数据集来进行同类比较，作者在文中指出了这一点。

这是因为根据这篇论文，学习优势的“下降”发生在17或18岁，但这是为什么呢？18岁时发生了什么?是因为在18岁时人们的大脑发生了一些不可思议的神奇变化吗?或者是人们的生活从根本上改变了——你上了大学，或进入了职场，或搬出了父母的房子，等等?

“关键时期”有可能是文化的附带现象:我们确定的年龄(17-18岁)与许多社会变化同时发生，其中任何一种变化都可能削弱一个人学习一门新语言的能力、机会或意愿。在许多文化中，这个年龄标志着向劳动力或专业教育的过渡，这可能会减少外语学习的机会。

如果你从5岁开始“学习”一门语言，你就不会每天坐下来啃一本外文书，花一个小时专门地学习这门语言。几乎可以肯定，你是处在一个说那种语言的教室环境中，可能每天要讲几个小时。如果你在20岁以后开始学习一门语言，你几乎肯定不能每天在教室里呆上几个小时。

我想说的是，平均来说，如果你在20岁以后开始学习一门语言，你每天接触的语言量会比你5岁开始学习的时候少很多。

如果一个小孩子你在一个说英语的学校一天呆5小时，而他的父母每天花一个小时学习同一种语言，孩子学习比父母快5倍,然后得出结论,孩子比成年人学的更好，这公平吗?

事实很有可能是，这种年龄上的学习差异并不是因为大脑可塑性发生了某种神奇的变化，而只是因为成年人没有像儿童那么多的时间来接触这些知识，而且往往到了一段时间后，这些知识就不再对成长有帮助了，达到母语水平几乎没有什么额外的优势。也许并不是年纪大的学生学起来更难，或者他们没有能力，也许只是因为他们没有同样的机会。

拿20岁以上开始学习人群的前四分之一作比较，只是一个简单的猜测，目的是将一群可能有更多接触机会的语言学习者隔离开来。我想，20岁以后的学习者会比孩子们有更多不同类型的机会，他们的经历可能在本质上更相似。这当然不是完美的，但它确实表明，在20岁以后开始学习的人群中，有一些人做得很好。

这个测验难度非常大

这里还有一些有趣的事情需要注意。首先是这个测验有多难。即使是那些从小就开始学习这门语言的学习者，也要经过至少7-8年的学习，才能在这个测试中始终取得90%以上的成绩。

这个测试不是关于流利程度，而是关于语法的准确性。如果你通过了整个测试，你可能已经非常接近“基本流利”水平了。

如果你认为这篇文章解释了为什么你坚持用某款英语学习APP三个月后仍然不能流利地说英语的原因，那你就错了。孩子们也不会通过这种方式熟练地学习一门语言。

对儿童和成人在实验室或浸入式学习项目的研究表明，成人的表现比儿童更好，而不是更差(Huang, 2015; Krashen, Long, & Scarcella, 1979; Snow & Hoefnagel-Höhle, 1978),也许是因为他们能有意识的战略部署和屏蔽他们的第一语言。
——来自（A Critical Period for Second Language Acquisition）

实际上，成年人在很多方面都更擅长学习一门语言，达到一般流利的程度。但是，无论你多大年纪开始学习，要达到能像母语人士那样准确回答最细微的语法问题，都需要10年的时间。

有那么多成年人在20岁以后(甚至更晚)开始学习一门语言，他们在这次测试中取得如此优异的成绩，这应该是鼓舞人心的。如果你想付出努力，完全有可能在像这样高难度的测试中达到母语水平——成千上万的人都做到了。

你的第一语言是什么并不重要

这篇论文还给了我们一些其他非常有趣的见解，他们让近3/4万人参加测试，并得到人口统计数据。

首先要注意的是，他们实际上得到的从20岁以后开始学习的人的数据是很少的，这只是他们数据集的一小部分。

另一个问题是测试者来自不同的国家。

人们常说“这门语言很难学”或“那门语言很容易学”，但数据显示，这些说法可能并不正确。他们发现，来自任何语言背景的学生在学习英语的速度或最终达到英语水平方面几乎没有什么不同。

事实上，不同语言组之间的差异很小(见下图)，而且通常不可靠。
——来自（A Critical Period for Second Language Acquisition）

坚持学习一门语言一年就可以变得相当流利

最后，通过这篇文章，我希望每个人都能从中学到的是：成年人在语言学习方面有很强的能力。对我们来说，要想成为一个地道的母语者可能很难，这可能是显而易见的，而且达到母语水平并不是我们大多数人开始学习一门语言的原因，对吧?你又不是想当间谍。

看一下我之前的各种语言组的图表。你可以看到，即使经过一年的学习，20岁以上才开始学习外语的小组通常也在这个极其困难的语法测试中得分80-85%。

当然，你可能还要花上10年的时间才能完美通过这个测试，但是不妨看看你一年能做什么!

在一两年的时间里，人们不断地学习新的语言，可以从什么都不会到具备一些能力，再到流利的水平，而且就我个人经验而言，在同样的时间里，成年人学习新语言的速度要比孩子们快得多。

正如本文所示，从流利到母语水平的最后一步更困难，但就像80/20规则一样，前80%的成果需要20%的时间。

你可以在几年的工作中流利地掌握一门语言，我经常看到这种例子。这篇论文进一步证明，即使是在很晚的时候才开始学习，仍然有可能达到非常高的外语水平。

原文链接：https://medium.com/@chacon/mit-scientists-prove-adults-learn-language-to-fluency-nearly-as-well-as-children-1de888d1d45f

引文链接

Economists: Jefferson's heirs still find tyranny easier to define than freedom

THIS weekend, some Americans, at least, have been pondering the meaning of religious liberty. January 16th has been designated Religious Freedom Day because it is the anniversary of what Thomas Jefferson regarded as one of his greatest achievements, ranking with the Declaration of Independence: the approval of a statute in his native Virginia which overturned the entrenched status of the Anglican church and set all faiths on an equal footing before the law. Although he was an Anglican himself, of a very free-thinking sort, he admired the integrity of his non-conformist compatriots and came to the view that religious privilege damaged everybody, including the privileged. The statute's opening lines reflect the American founder's mastery of language and clarity of thought.

Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishment or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was his Almighty power to do.

It's probably just coincidence, but this sonorous passage seems to echo a verse in the Koran: "If God had willed, he could surely have made you all one single community, but he willed otherwise in order to test you...." Anyway, whatever inspired them, these well-crafted words about the "hypocrisy and meanness" of faith enforced by state power must rank as one of the eloquent critiques of theocracy ever made.

To mark the anniversary, the chairman of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and one of his fellow commissioners co-signed an op-ed which drew attention to the lamentable—and in many ways worsening—state of religious liberty in the world today. They wrote, for example, that:

China and North Korea exemplify secular tyrannies that suppress religious groups across the board. Others like Iran and Saudi Arabia enthrone one religion or religious interpretation while often brutalising those embracing alternatives, from dissenting Muslims to Christians to Bahais.

Also singled out was Myanmar, a country where "Buddhist extremists have furiously assaulted Rohingya Muslims." The co-authors also recalled that back in 2014, a Christian bishop in Baghdad had predicted that the nihilist fury of Islamic State's terror would in due course reach Europe; this forecast had come horribly true.

As it happens, the two authors of this article are both Roman Catholic but they belong in different ideological corners, and they would have different ideas about the meaning of religious freedom in a domestic American context. USCIRF chairman Robert George, a professor of jurisprudence at Princeton University, is a prominent "theocon" intellectual who strongly opposes abortion and same-sex marriage and supports the right of citizens to opt out of things that offend their religious conscience, such as catering for gay weddings. His co-author Father Thomas Reese is on the liberal end of Catholicism; as a magazine editor, he incurred the displeasure of the Vatican with his ideas on priestly celibacy and has argued that Catholics should accept same-sex marriage as a legal reality.

But faced with the truly appalling things that are happening around the world to religious dissenters (such as the death sentence for apostasy passed on a Palestinian poet in Saudi Arabia) the two men have no difficulty coming together and making common cause. They agreed, for example, on urging the Obama administration to revise and enlarge its list of countries which are seen as serious violators of religious freedom; the current, nine-strong list has not been reviewed since mid-2014.

In Jefferson's time, too, the precise meaning of religious freedom was hotly contested. Even after the constitution barred any established religion at federal level, many individual states retained an established creed during the early years of the Union. But however differently they defined freedom, those early Americans felt they could recognise tyranny when it was staring them in the face. One cannot but hope that remains the case today.

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The Guardian: Artist Ai Weiwei banned from using Lego to build Australian artwork

Reported by the Guardian, Chinese dissident artist Ai Weiwei says Danish toymaker Lego has refused his studio's request for a bulk order of the plastic toys on political grounds.

In an Instagram post on Friday evening, the artist said Lego had refused the bulk order in September, quoting the company as saying it “cannot approve the use of Legos for political works”, as below:

Coincidentally, The artist's accusation follows news this week that British firm Merlin Entertainments will open a Legoland park in Shanghai in conjunction with a Chinese partner. That announcement, timed to coincide with Chinese president Xi Jinping's state visit to the UK, seems to have prompted the artist's Instagram post.

There seems to be no precedent for the company to refuse a bulk order on political grounds, also Lego did not return a request for comment.

Well, Lego may have forgotten the two following pictures proving that someone else have taken Lego for the use of political works:

It looks Lego does not care at all whether someone may use it for political purpose, but would concern much if Ai Weiwei's politically-meaningful art angers Mainland China, which may threat its profit-making.

So, in order to help Lego to make some money, may I know where to purchase the two Lego models above?

The Economists: Xi’s history lessons

The Communist Party is plundering history to justify its present-day ambitions.

IN EARLY September President Xi Jinping will take the salute at a huge military parade in Beijing. It will be his most visible assertion of authority since he came to power in 2012: his first public appearance at such a display of missiles, tanks and goose-stepping troops. Officially the event will be all about the past, commemorating the end of the second world war in 1945 and remembering the 15m Chinese people who died in one of its bloodiest chapters: the Japanese invasion and occupation of China of 1937-45.

It will be a reminder of the bravery of China's soldiers and their crucial role in confronting Asia's monstrously aggressive imperial power. And rightly so: Chinese sacrifices during that hellish period deserve much wider recognition. Between 1937, when total war erupted in China, and late 1941, when the attack on Pearl Harbor brought America into the fray, China fought the Japanese alone. By the end of the war it had lost more people—soldiers and civilians—than any other country bar the Soviet Union.

Yet next month's parade is not just about remembrance; it is about the future, too. This is the first time that China is commemorating the war with a military show, rather than with solemn ceremony. The symbolism will not be lost on its neighbours. And it will unsettle them, for in East Asia today the rising, disruptive, undemocratic power is no longer a string of islands presided over by a god-emperor. It is the world's most populous nation, led by a man whose vision for the future (a richer country with a stronger military arm) sounds a bit like one of Japan's early imperial slogans. It would be wrong to press the parallel too far: China is not about to invade its neighbours. But there are reasons to worry about the way the Chinese Communist Party sees history—and massages it to justify its current ambitions.

History with Chinese characteristics

Under Mr Xi, the logic of history goes something like this. China played such an important role in vanquishing Japanese imperialism that not only does it deserve belated recognition for past valour and suffering, but also a greater say in how Asia is run today. Also, Japan is still dangerous. Chinese schools, museums and TV programmes constantly warn that the spirit of aggression still lurks across the water. A Chinese diplomat has implied that Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is a new Voldemort, the epitome of evil in the “Harry Potter” series. At any moment Japan could menace Asia once more, party newspapers intone. China, again, is standing up to the threat.

As our essay on the ghosts of the war that ended 70 years ago this week explains, this narrative requires exquisite contortions. For one thing, it was not the Chinese communists who bore the brunt of the fighting against Japan, but their sworn enemies, the nationalists (or Kuomintang) under Chiang Kai-shek. For another, today's Japan is nothing like the country that slaughtered the inhabitants of Nanjing, forced Korean and Chinese women into military brothels or tested biological weapons on civilians.

Granted, Japan never repented of its war record as full-throatedly as Germany did. Even today a small but vocal group of Japanese ultra-nationalists deny their country's war crimes, and Mr Abe, shamefully, sometimes panders to them. Yet the idea that Japan remains an aggressive power is absurd. Its soldiers have not fired a shot in anger since 1945. Its democracy is deeply entrenched; its respect for human rights profound. Most Japanese acknowledge their country's war guilt. Successive governments have apologised, and Mr Abe is expected to do the same (see article). Today Japan is ageing, shrinking, largely pacifist and, because of the trauma of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, unlikely ever to possess nuclear weapons. Some threat.

The dangers of demonisation

China's demonisation of Japan is not only unfair; it is also risky. Governments that stoke up nationalist animosity cannot always control it. So far, China's big show of challenging Japan's control of the Senkaku (or Diaoyu) islands has involved only sabre-rattling, not bloodshed. But there is always a danger that a miscalculation could lead to something worse.

East Asia's old war wounds have not yet healed. The Korean peninsula remains sundered, China and Taiwan are separate, and even Japan can be said to be split, for since 1945 America has used the southern island of Okinawa as its main military stronghold in the western Pacific. The Taiwan Strait and the border between North and South Korea continue to be potential flashpoints; whether they one day turn violent depends largely on China’s behaviour, for better or worse. It is naive to assume America will always be able to keep a lid on things.

On the contrary, many Asians worry that China's ambitions set it on a collision course with the superpower and the smaller nations that shelter under its security umbrella. When China picks fights with Japan in the East China Sea, or builds airstrips on historically disputed reefs in the South China Sea, it feeds those fears. It also risks sucking America into its territorial disputes, and raises the chances of eventual conflict.

Post-war East Asia is not like western Europe. No NATO or European Union binds former foes together. France's determination to promote lasting peace by uniting under a common set of rules with Germany, its old invader, has no Asian equivalent. East Asia is therefore less stable than western Europe: a fissile mix of countries both rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, with far less agreement on common values or even where their borders lie. Small wonder Asians are skittish when the regional giant, ruled by a single party that draws little distinction between itself and the Chinese nation, plays up themes of historical victimhood and the need to correct for it.

How much better it would be if China sought regional leadership not on the basis of the past, but on how constructive its behaviour is today. If Mr Xi were to commit China to multilateral efforts to foster regional stability, he would show that he has truly learned the lessons of history. That would be far, far better than repeating it.